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Abstract 
Public debt accumulation results to disutility with the problem addressed as whether 
time path of the public debt is sustainable. In this study the infinite time differential 
game modeling is used as appropriate tool for the economic analysis that follows. The 
dynamic game is simple and assumes that the starting point of the public debt model 
is the well known accounting identity interrelating public debt, interest rate and real 
government surplus exclusive of interest payments on public debt. In the setting, we 
consider as stock the public debt and the stress of the regulator is to raise nation’s 
primary surplus. Any surplus increase is not only dependent on government measures, 
but is also dependent on the known “culture of corruption” and on tax evasion. Thus 
the process of surpluses’ augmentation should be a function of these two factors. Nash 
and Stackelberg differential game approaches are used to explore strategic 
interactions. In the Nash equilibrium establishment of cyclical strategies during the 
game between the group of people involved in illegal activities of corruption and tax 
evasion in one hand and the government in the other, requires that the discount rate of 
the group of people involved in illegal actions must be greater than government’s 
discount rate. That is the group of corrupt officials and evaders must be more 
impatient than government. In the case of hierarchical setting analytical expressions 
of the strategies and the steady state value of public debt stock are provided. 
Furthermore a number of propositions are stated. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we deal with the dynamics of accumulation of a nation’s public 
debt which harms prosperity of the economic agents of a country or a nation. As it is 
already known public debt accumulation produces disutility, therefore is detrimental 
to nations’ households, because it reduces their consumption in order to meet their 
future tax burden (Greiner and Fincke, 2009) 
Game theory may be used as an appropriate methodology to design efficient 
actions against accumulation of public debt, as the regulator has to take into 
consideration the response of victims e.g. the honest taxpayers and so on. As it 
happens in most cases, every socially undesirable stock is an irreversible fact and 
therefore one main concern of social planers should be the discovery of effective 
ways to reduce the sources responsible for the unwished stock accumulation. We use 
both Nash and Stackelberg differential game approaches to study intertemporal 
strategic interactions between the group of corrupt officials and the tax evaders on one 
hand and the government on the other. 
The major problem of the public debt accumulation requires finding ways to 
effectively reduce this unwished stock, maintaining at the same time the standards of 
the economic process within a country. In the macroeconomic literature the same 
problem is addressed as whether the time path of public debt is sustainable.  
Nowadays modern models about sustainability of public debt do not involve the 
central bank of an economy, as central banks are independent and therefore the 
nation’s government should not rely on central banks when deciding about real public 
debt reduction. As it is well known the main goal of the government is to achieve 
sustainable debt policies. In order to show how public debt and (primary) surpluses 
are (crucially) connected, we resort in the recent literature.  
 3 
In macroeconomics literature and in the case the interest rate exceeds the 
growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP), a given debt policy is said 
sustainable if the primary surplus relative to GDP is a positive and linearly increasing 
function of the debt to GDP ratio. If a government pursues a sustainable policy the 
debt ratio remains constant in the long-run or it converges to zero. As it is pointed out 
by Greiner and Fincke (2009), a stationary debt to GDP ratio tends to be sustainable if 
the government raises its own primary surpluses as the public debt rises. Moreover, it 
is known that there exist a statistically significant positive correlation between 
government debt levels and a measure of corruption (see also Kaufmann, 2010).  
In the present model we introduce the possibility that households will engage in 
illegal activities such as corruption and tax evasion. Households employed in the public 
sector consider diverting public funds, earmarked to finance investment projects, for their 
own private use. Households employed in the private sector consider hiding income from 
the government to avoid taxation. Following the standards, we model all households as 
having some aversion to illegal activity and the aversion varies inversely with the average 
level of corruption by government officials. That is the so called “culture-of-corruption” 
effect—the average level of corruption among government officials reduces guilt 
associated with the illegal activity of individual households.  
According to Ivanya et al. (2015) corruption and tax evasion interact with each 
other, but the combined presence of both causes net tax rate to be significantly higher 
than in the benchmark model with no corruption and evasion. Here extending the 
model of Ivanya et al. (2015), we include the interaction between corruption - tax 
evasion on one side and public debt on the other. 
Returning to the model solution problems, one of the main concerns should be 
the irregularity of multiple equilibrium points. Finding multiple equilibrium points in 
economic models is not an attractive solution for policy makers. But the recognition 
 4 
of multiple optimal stable equilibrium points may be crucial in order to locate the 
thresholds separating the basins of attraction surrounding these different equilibria. 
Starting at a threshold, a rational economic agent is indifferent between moving 
toward one or the other equilibrium, but a small movement away from the threshold 
can "destroy" this indifference, leading in a unique optimal course of action.  
The introductory one sector, with a convex - concave production function, the 
optimal growth model of Skiba (1978) was the start of a fast growing literature 
towards the cyclical solution strategies generated in intertemporal dynamic economic 
models. Wirl (1995), in resources stock literature, reconsidering a model of Clark et al 
(1979), concludes that equilibrium that falls below the maximum sustainable yield but 
that exceeds the intertemporal harvest rule due to the positive spillovers allows for 
optimal, long run, cyclical harvest strategies.  
As it is already made clear, the purpose of the present paper is to uncover 
principles underpinning efficient design of countermeasures against the sources of the 
undesired public debt accumulation. In particular, we model the optimal balance of 
competing parties and we intend to find the implications of misspecification at the 
level for success or failure. An important aim of the first part of our research is the 
identification of mechanisms generating oscillations of both responsible (for the 
public debt) agents' illegal activities and periodic countermeasures taken by the 
government. The discussion of a threshold occurrence is not only limited in the well 
known (S, s) policies in inventory management, but there are however, other 
nonlinearities implying oscillatory behavior.  
We intend to study this issue by using the methodology of stable limit cycles. 
Limit cycles, has the intuitive explanation which states that if a trajectory of a 
continuous dynamical system stays in a bounded region forever, it has to approach a 
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point or a cycle. Cycles gives rise to cyclical policies in economic models, e.g. if a 
policy trajectory say a higher primary surplus policy, which is restricted in a bounded 
planar space then this policy sooner or later will retrace its previous steps.  Moreover, 
in higher than the two dimensional systems, sufficient conditions for the existence of 
limit cycles of nonlinear dynamical systems are provident. Arithmetically the 
sufficient conditions require that a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues exists, for a 
particular value of the bifurcation parameter, and the real part of this pair of 
eigenvalues changes smoothly its sign as the parameter is altered from below its 
actual value to above.  
The stability of limit cycles is of great importance for the long run behavior of 
a dynamical system. Economic mechanisms that may be a source of limit cycles, as 
mentioned by Dockner and Feichtinger (1995) are:  
(i) complementarity over time,  
(ii) dominated cross effects with respect to capital stocks, and  
(iii) positive growth of equilibrium. 
The contribution of the paper, in the public economics field, is that it considers 
the accumulation of public debt as a conflict between two rivals. One is the 
government policy imposing measures in order to augment primary surplus, which in 
turn ensures sustainability of public debt, while the other is the group of the corrupted 
people together with the people that evade both involved in illegal actions. As 
mentioned, the problem is modeled first as a Nash differential game, for which we 
explore at equilibrium the possibility of limit cycles and second as a Stackelberg 
differential game for which we calculate the equilibrium strategies. Such stock 
accumulation and regulation control models can be found, among others, in Forster 
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(1980) concerning optimal energy use model and in Xepapadeas (1992) regarding 
environmental policy design and non-point source pollution. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 comments on 
cyclical policies in control of the undesirable public debt, while Section 3 introduces 
the Nash differential game and gives a necessary condition for cyclical strategies. 
Section 4 investigates the Stackelberg differential game between the regulator and the 
corrupted agents and calculates the equilibrium strategies and the players’ value 
functions. The last section concludes the paper.   
 
2. Cyclical policies in public debt accumulation and impatience 
An intuitive explanation of cyclical policies in the following public debt 
model between economic agents involved in illegal activities (corrupt officials and tax 
evaders) and the government may be the subsequent. The group of people involved in 
illegal actions derive utility from the higher intensity of its illegal activity, such as 
corruption and tax evasion, while the other side (i.e. the government) derive utility 
from the measures taken against the illegal mechanisms (e.g. counter tax evasion). Let 
us start with rather low and declining stock of public debt. A farsighted regulator, 
which only gains benefits from the reduction of public debt, will curb its measures 
against, since further reduction of the public debt’s stock would only be possible at 
high costs. As a consequence the stock of public debt begins to grow again.  
Now the corrupt officials together with tax evaders has to react by increasing 
the intensity of their illegal mechanisms but only moderately, since government 
measures would not be still very efficient with higher costs and moderate benefits for 
the government. Moreover this would stabilize the stock of public debt and the 
dynamical system would approach a stable steady state. If the group of corrupt 
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officials and tax evaders has a high discount rate, that is a realistic assumption, they 
behave myopically reacting strongly, i.e. they intensify their illegal activities. This 
provokes measures on the government's side which in turn lead to an increasing 
reduction of public debt. To avoid public debt’s reduction the group of illegally acting 
economic agents have to reduce the intensity of their mechanisms, so the cycle would 
close. 
 
3. The Nash Differential Game 
Let us denote by  x t  the instantaneous public debt of a country at time t . 
Without any government's measures taken and also without any other actions on the 
side of the group of people involved in illegal actions, the stock of resources grows 
according to the function  g x , which is considered as growth function, obviously 
dependent on the interest rate, satisfying the conditions    0 0,   0g g x   for all 
 0,x K ,   0g x   for all  ,x K  ,   0g x  . Starting up the mechanisms, 
which are responsible for the accumulation of the public debt, is costly for the group 
of people involved in illegal actions (corrupt officials and tax evaders), e.g. 
compliance costs. These costs reduce their capital available to their illegal activities.  
The reduction of the growth of the public debt, however, does not only depend 
on the intensity of the illegal activities  t , but is also influenced by the measures 
 u t  against illegality, undertaken by the government. We set as instrument variables 
for both sides the intensity of illegal activities  t  and the government's actions  u t  
undertaken against, which are assumed non-negatives    0,    0t u t   . 
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According to the recent proposed models, one way for the public debt 
accumulation reduction is the function of primary surplus. In our case the surplus 
function is denoted by  ,u   and is a function of the two control variables, instead 
of a single time function. Combining the growth of public debt  g x  with the surplus 
function  ,u   the state dynamics can be written as 
                         ,x g x u   ,           00 0x x                             1  
Along a trajectory the non negativity constraint is imposed, that is  
                                     0     0x t t                                                    2  
With the assumption of the compliance costs and the damages incurred in the group of 
illegally acting people, a higher intensity of actions of those people and also the 
government measures, cause a stronger reduction of their capital resources and 
therefore we assume the partial derivatives of the surplus’ function  ,u   to be 
positive, i.e. 0,   0u    . Moreover the law of diminishing returns is applied only 
for the government actions undertaken, that is 0uu   and for simplicity we assume 
0  .   
The utility functions the two players need to maximize defined as follows: 
Player 1, the government, derive instantaneous utility, on one hand from the primary 
surplus  ,u  , and on the other hand from their measures effort  u t  which gives 
rise to increasing and convex costs  a u . Moreover the disutility derived by the high 
level of public debt is described by the increasing function  x . Summing up, the 
present value of player's 1 utility is described by the following functional 
                                  11
0
,tJ e u x a u dt   

               3  
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Player 2, the group of economic agents which act illegal (corrupt officials and tax 
evaders), enjoy immediate utility  x from the level of public debt  x t , and utility, 
as well, from the intensity   of their illegal methods used, which is described by the 
function    . For the utilities  x  and     we assume that are monotonically 
increasing functions with decreasing marginal returns, therefore for the first 
derivatives we have    0,   0x      and for the second    0,   0x     . 
So, player’s 2 utility function is defined, in its additively separable form, as: 
                                        22
0
tJ e x dt   

                               4  
3.1. Equilibrium analysis 
We begin analysis with the concept of open loop Nash equilibrium, which is 
based on the fact that every player’s strategy is the best reply to the opponent’s 
exogenously given strategy. Obviously, equilibrium holds if both strategies are 
simultaneously best replies. 
The current value Hamiltonians for both players, are defined as follows 
                       1 , ,H u x a u g x u           
                      2 ,H x g x u          
The first order conditions, for the maximization problem, are the following system of 
differential equations for both players: 
First, the maximized Hamiltonians are 
                             1 1 , 0uH u a uu   
                         5  
                            2 , 0H u   
                              6  
and second the costate variables are defined by the equations 
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                          11 1H g x xx     
        
               7  
                         22 2H g x xx     
        
              8  
3.2. Stability of equilibrium 
An interior steady state  * * *, ,x    with the optimal controls  * *,u   is a 
solution of the following system (taking steady states): 
                                     
   
    
    
     
   
1
2
,
1 ,
,
u
g x u
g x x
g x x
u a u
u
 
  
  
  
   

  
  
 

 
and the Jacobian matrix, evaluated at the steady state, is 
           
              
              
1 1 1
2 2 2
, , ,
              
              
g x u g x u g x u
x
J g x x g x x g x x
x
g x x g x x g x x
x
      
        
 
        
 
                                                   
                             
            
 
which after  the simple calculations, takes the following final form: 
                  
     
     
     
1
2
, ,
0
0
g x u u
J g x x g x
g x x g x
     
  
  
                         
 9  
The main stability analysis is focused in periodic solutions, and therefore we make 
use of the Hopf bifurcations. Thus, computing determinants and trace of the Jacobian 
matrix  9  we have  
                                  1 2trJ g x      
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           
       
1 2 2
1
,
det
,
          
u
J g g x g x g x x g x
u
g x x g x
      
    
                          
           
 
The Jacobian  9  possesses two purely imaginary eigenvalues i   if the condition  
det
0
tr
J
J
   holds. 
In the following we compute the value of   as: 
             21 2
, ,u u
g x g x x g x x
          
                       
A Hopf bifurcation can thus only occur if the conditions 0  and the following  
           
 
1 2
1 2 1 2
, ,
2
u u
g x x g x x
g x
         
   
              
    
               10  
has to hold.  
In what follows we give specific forms in the functions of the model in order 
to extract some useful conclusions for periodic solutions. 
3.3. Specifications of the model 
We specify the functions involved as  
Growth function of public debt :         1g x Rx x               11.1  
The primary surplus function as a Cobb – Douglas type  
                                         ,u u                                       11.2  
The government’s cost function as a linear function 
                                          a u au                                        11.3  
The government’s damage function  x and the agents' utility derived from the 
resource stock  x  in linear forms, respectively 
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                                           x x                                       11.4  
                                            x x                                       11.5  
Finally, the utility function derived from the illegal mechanisms’ intensive usage (on 
behalf the group of people acting illegally), we assume to be in the form 
                    
1
1
   

                                   11.6   
with  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  0,   ,  0,1r a b       
For the above specifications, the necessary condition for cyclical strategies is given 
from the next proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 
Given the specifications   11.1  -   11.6   for the functions of the model, a necessary 
condition for cyclical strategies is that the government is more farsighted than the 
illegal acting people (corrupt officials and evaders) which are responsible for the 
unwished public debt, therefore the condition 2 1   has to hold. 
Proof 
In appendix A 
 
4. The Stackelberg Setting 
In this section we analyze the case in which the two players of the game move 
hierarchically and the rate of measures taken against illegal activities is chosen by the 
government before the group of illegal acting agents decides on the rate of their 
methods, thus the government is the leader. 
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4.1. The group of illegal acting people as follower 
We first consider the optimization problem for the follower, i.e. the group of corrupt 
officials and tax evaders, which takes the action of the leader as given. The above 
group face the following objective which is maximized, that is  
                                          2
0
max te x dt

  

   
Note that the maximization takes place with respect to the intensity of the 
mechanisms utilization, which means higher intensive use. The state variable evolves 
according to  1 , for which the growth function is simplified in linear form, i.e. 
 g x rx . Thus, the resources equation of motion becomes  ,x rx u   . 
Moreover we assume separability of the model through the separable utility function 
of the group of illegal acting people. Therefore we assume that the utility enjoyed by 
the public debt would be in the form,  x x   and the utility derived from the 
intensive use of their mechanisms would be in the linear form     , as well. 
The responsible agents' Hamiltonian current value, after the above simplifications is 
                          2 ,H x rx u           
The first order conditions for an interior solution w.r.t. the control   is therefore, 
                                 2 , 0H u  
     
and the specification for the primary surplus function the following:  ,u u    , 
1 . 
Next we get the optimal control function for the group who act illegal, as 
follows 
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                        
1
1
1 * 1        u u u
  

    
 
 
        
                 12  
Now, the adjoint variable   has to follow the differential equation 
                            22 2H rx     
    
                         13  
Substituting the follower’s optimal control function  12  into the primary surplus 
function, we take the analytical form of the surplus function, as: 
                       1* * 1,u u u u u

     



      
                    14  
The readable expressions of  12  and  14  leads to the conclusion which says that, 
since 1  and therefore 0
1

  , an increase to the measures against the illegal 
activities on behalf the government, u , results in a more cautious control on behalf 
the followers',  * u . Similarly,  14  leads to a lower reduction of the public debt, i.e. 
  *,u u  . 
 
4.2. The Government as regulator 
Following Dockner et al. (2000) (especially Chapter 5) we formulate the 
government's problem, for which the leader has to take into account the dynamics of 
the optimal decisions of the follower, expressed by the adjoint equation   13 . 
Equation  13  now becomes the second state's evolution, so the leader's problem now 
is treated as an optimal control problem with two state variables.  Moreover, 
combining with the early calculated analytical form  14 , the leader's objective 
 15 
functional becomes (we assume the damage function    , due to intensive use of 
mechanisms, in the form     ) 
               1
1
1 1
1 1
0
max t
u
e u au x u dt

      
 
    
                        
        15  
which is subject to both state dynamics, the original resource’s dynamics plus the 
intensity’s shadow price dynamics which stems from the follower’s maximization 
problem, i.e. the following dynamics 
                                      
1
1x rx u

 
 



      
                              16  
                                          2 r                                      17  
The Hamiltonian current value of the above system  15  -  17  becomes  
   
1
1 1
1
1 21H u au x rx r

  
         
 
 

                                 
 
with ,     to denote the adjoint variables of the states ,  x   respectively. We note 
again that the shadow price   for the group of illegal acting people now becomes the 
new state variable for the government’s problem. 
Taking first order conditions we are able to express analytically the leader’s optimal 
control *u  as a function of the adjoints ,    , that is, 
           
1 1
1 1 1 0    
1
H
u a
u

  
  
  
  

                
 
             
1
1 1
* 1   ,
1
a
u
 
          

                      
              18  
Moreover, the adjoints follow the differential equations 
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                     11 1H rx     
    
                                19  
                    11 1 2H aur      
     
                        20  
Note that, thanks to state separability, the government’s adjoint variable  , with 
respect to the follower’s adjoint variable  , has no influence on the leader's 
optimization problem. 
The findings in the Stackelberg game are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.  
In the Stackelberg game with the government as leader and the group of illegal acting 
people as follower, a feasible solution exists, iff   is sufficient large, i.e. iff 
           
    
 
1 2
1
1 r r
r
     
  
    

     or     
 1  
      21  
The optimal strategies are then given by 
                           
 
 
1
1 1
* 1
1S
a
u
 
     
   

                     
                      22  
                            
 
 
1
1 1
* 1
1S
a
 
         

                     
                      23  
the optimal primary surplus function is given by 
                        
1 1
* 1,
1S
a
u
 
          
                     
                     24  
The steady state value of the public debt is given by 
 17 
                     
1 111
,
1S
a
x u
r
 
         
   
                  
                  25  
Proof 
The values    22 25  follow, from further substitutions of  18 , from the 
maximization condition 1 0
H

   and from the steady state condition 
 *0       , 0Sx rx h u     . 
 
Proposition 3.  
In the Stackelberg game the analytic forms of the objective functionals are given by1 
            
   
 
1
1 1
1 0
1 1
1 1
1S
a a x
J
r
 
       
     

                         
         26  
           
   
 
1
1 1
2 0
2 2
1 1
1S
a x
J
r
 
       
     

                        
                 27  
 
Proposition 4. 
For the values of   such that 
                            
   1 1
            
    
    
the regulator as leader act more cautiously and the follower more aggressively 
compared to the Nash case[2]. This leads to a higher function of the primary surplus 
and a higher profit of the Stackelberg follower compared to the Nash case. For values 
                                               
1 Proof available on request. 
 
2 For the Nash differential game exposition, see Halkos and Papageorgiou (2011a, b). 
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of   larger than  1 

, i.e. 
 1  
      
, the government acts more 
aggressively and the group of corrupt officials and tax evaders more cautiously 
compared to the Nash case, leading to a lower primary surplus function and a lower 
objective value for the follower compared to the Nash case.3 
 
Since  is the crucial variable which measures damages due to the intensive 
use of illegal mechanisms, it is obvious (from proposition 4) that for large values of  
  the regulator follows more truculent policy, but for small values of  the leader's 
policy is holding back.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to investigate the dynamics of the public debt 
accumulation together with the actions undertaken for counter accumulation. For this 
purpose we setup a very simple model of accumulation. We model the public debt as 
an accumulated stock first in a simultaneous (Nash) game. The Nash game takes place 
between the government which uses as control its counter–accumulation policy and 
the group of corrupt officials and tax evaders using the intensity of their illegal actions 
as their control variable. The economic analysis that follows in the game’s solution, 
focused on cyclical policies, reveals the possibility of limit cycles. As a result we 
found the sufficient condition for the cyclical policies existence. According to that 
result it suffices, assuming different discount rates, the group of illegal acting agents' 
discount rate to be greater than the government’s discount rate.  
                                               
3 Proof available on request. 
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In the second setting, we extend the simultaneous move in a hierarchical 
(Stackelberg) differential game, for which the government undertakes the role of 
leader, while the answerable agents undertake the follower’s role. In the above 
Stackelberg game, we first calculate the analytical expressions of the player’s 
strategies and the analytical expression of the reducing resources function.  
We also found the steady state of the agents' resources stock. The analytical 
expressions of the value functions are finally calculated. The last proposition of the 
paper concerns about the behavior of the primary surplus function. To be more 
precise, we found the interval between one crucial parameter of the model lies. If this 
parameter lies between certain values the reducing function takes higher values, 
leading therefore to higher profits for the follower, compared with the Nash case.  
On the other hand, if the parameter takes a higher value than the threshold, the 
government acts more aggressively and the polluters more cautiously, leading to a 
lower reducing function and therefore to a lower objective value for the follower, in 
comparison to the Nash case. 
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Appendix A 
 
Proof of proposition 1. 
With the specifications, given in subsection entitled "3.3. Specifications of the 
model", one can compute  
   1 2g x R x   ,   2g x R  ,   1,u u u    ,  ,u u   ,  a u a  , 
  2     ,  x   ,  x    
        11 0      1 , '       1uH u a u u au
                     .1  
    22 0      ,       H u u      
                                 .2  
Combining  .1  and  .2  the optimal strategies take the following forms 
                          
    2 1 1 1
1 1 1 1*
1
a
u
  
   
     
     
          
 .3 ,     
                          
  1 1 1
1 1 1 1*
1
a
  
     
    
     
      
       .4  
and the optimal reducing function becomes 
                  
    1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1* *,
1
a
u
   
     
     
     
      
                  .5  
with the following partial derivatives 
  
 
    
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
* *
1 1
1 1 1 1
, 1
       
1 1 1 1
a
u
   
     
   
   
  
     
     
           
    
       .6  
  
 
    
  
 
  
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2
* *
1 1
1 1 1
, 1
       
1 1 1
a
u
   
   
   
 
  
     
     
         
   
       .7  
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Both derivatives  .6 ,  .7  are negatives due to the assumptions on the parameters 
 ,    0,1    and on the signs of the functions derivates, that is 
   0,  0,  0,  0u x x        , which ensures the positive sign of the adjoints 
,    . 
Bifurcation condition 
 
 
det  
     
tr  
J
J
   now becomes  
     1 2 1 2 1 22g x g x g x       
           , which after substituting the 
values from  .6 ,   .7  and making the rest of algebraic manipulations, finally 
yields (at the steady states) 
   
        1 2 1 2 1 21
,
1 2 0
1 1 1
u g x
g x
g x
            
 
                  
 .8    
Where we have set  11 g x
 
       stemming from the adjoint equation 
    1 g x x       , which at the steady states reduces into 
    1x g x     . 
Condition 0w  after substitution the values from  .6 ,   .7  becomes 
           
2
1 2
1
,
1 1 0
1 1 1
u g x
w g x
g x
        
                  
        .9  
The division of  .8  by 1  yields 
   
        
2
2 1 2
1 1
,
1 2 0
1 1 1
u g x
g x
g x
          
 
                  
 .10  
The sum  .9 + .10  must be positive, thus after simplifications and taking into 
account that (at the steady state)    ,u g x    , we have: 
        
21 2
2
1 1 1 1
g x g x g x
  
  
         
 and the result 2 1   follows from 
the strict concavity of the growth function 0g   , since it is supposed  
0 1   and  0 1      , as well. 
 
